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This paper studies entrepreneurs’ objectives when starting a business and the impact of entrepreneurial and
ﬁrm characteristics on these objectives. Entrepreneurship involves two behaviors that lead to deﬁne two types of
entrepreneurs: those who start businesses to create and secure their own jobs (protection motive) and those who want
to develop their ﬁrms in terms of investment and personnel (developing motive). Individuals of the ﬁrst group are
deﬁned as self-protectors and the second as developers.
We show that the compositions of the self-protectors group and the developers group are very similar and differ
only in a few characteristics. People with a low degree and low start-up capital are in a greater proportion among
self-protectors. We use a French new entrepreneur survey and probit models to identify the determinants of choosing
self-protection or development. We ﬁnd that people who start ﬁrms to create their own jobs are those who are the most
discriminated against on the labor market and those who have no entrepreneurial network. People with low start-up
capital are more likely to become self-protector. Developers are those who have the possibility to be developers.
Key words: entrepreneurship, individual objectives, entrepreneurial behavior.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L21, L26.
1Université de Paris-Est Marne-la-vallée ERUDITE and TEPP; lionel.desiage@cee-recherche.fr, Le DESCARTES I, 29
Promenade Michel SIMON, 93166 NOISY-LE-GRAND CEDEX, tél.: +33 (0)1 45 92 68 28.1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing interest has developed on entrepreneurship and self-employment. The Schumpeterian
approach (Aghion and Howitt, 1997) advances the idea that entrepreneurial dynamism is the key to innovation and
growth. The entrepreneur is indeed a agent to spread innovation (Schumpeter, 1949); he/she is also a potential
employer when he/she decides to grow his/her ﬁrm. In that respect "the Entrepreneur is the single most important
player in a modern economy" (Lazear, 2003, p. 1). However research on entrepreneurship generally faces a lack
of information on entrepreneurs themselves. The literature (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998; Djankov et al., 2005;
Berglann et al., 2009) tries to identify entrepreneurs and the self-employed by determining who they are and why they
choose to start-up. Research generally focuses on the decision to become an entrepreneur or to become (remain as)
a paid worker and consequently establishes entrepreneurs’ proﬁles. In that respect, models of occupational choice
(Lazear, 2003; Poschke, 2008) show that the number of individual skills and education are determinants of the deci-
sion to start a business. They also point to the fact that entrepreneurs are less risk averse than other people (Kihlstrom
and Laffont, 1979) and that social networks play an important role in this decision, in particular many entrepreneurs
have relatives and/or friends who are entrepreneurs (Djankov et al., 2005). The decision is also analyzed through
earning differentials between the self-employed and paid workers. Self-employed people tend to earn less than paid
workers, but they receive non-pecuniary and fringe beneﬁts operating as compensations (Hamilton, 2000): a propor-
tion of entrepreneurs look for independence in becoming their own bosses or autonomy in their schedule ﬂexibility.
As opposed to them, another fraction of individuals become entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense (Schumpeter,
1934) that is they want to "build an empire" in largely developing their businesses. These observations show that
entrepreneurs have speciﬁc proﬁles in comparison to paid workers and suggest that the objectives when starting a ﬁrm
are different for each entrepreneur.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of entrepreneurs’ main objectives when they start their
businesses. According to the literature, our database identiﬁes two possible intentions: securing one’s own job on
the one hand (protection motive), developing the ﬁrm in terms of investment and personnel on the other (developing
motive). From this distinction, we deﬁne two categories of entrepreneurs and we assume that, when starting their
ﬁrms, ﬁrm-speciﬁcandentrepreneur-speciﬁccharacteristicsinﬂuencethedecisionbetweenthetwoobjectives. Section
2 presents the literature related to entrepreneurship and self-employment, explaining main ﬁndings and differences
between choosing self-employment or entrepreneurship and paid employment. This literature examines who wants
to become an entrepreneur and what is the main bridle to entrepreneurship i.e. liquidity constraints that people have
to face. This review allows us to draw four hypotheses related to the entrepreneurial objectives. Section 3 describes
the data that include entrepreneur and ﬁrm characteristics and presents the ﬁrst statistical results. The richness of the
data in describing human capital and entrepreneurial background allows us to establish how individual characteristics
play a role on the entrepreneurial aspiration. Statistically the differences between both objectives are seen through
a few variables: status on the labor market before starting, initial amount of capital. Among them, females are in
a larger proportion in the subsample "to secure one’s own job" than their male counterparts. Differences in start-up
capital are also found. At the light of these descriptive statistics, our four hypotheses are detailed. Then an empirical
methodology is proposed to test these hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and the role of different
elements in the decision to secure one’s own job or to develop the ﬁrm. Females and people with low start-up capital
are more likely to start a ﬁrm to secure their own jobs. Among personal characteristics, self-protectors are people
trying to avoid discrimination on the labor market. Section 5 summarizes conclusions.
2 Related Literature
Although the decision related to become an entrepreneur or remain as a paid worker and evidence on self-employment
have been analyzed, the entrepreneurial objective and behavior are less documented. An early literature deﬁnes the
entrepreneur under three main aspects as summed up in Langlois (2005, p. 4): "Kirzner is about discovery, about
2alertness to new opportunities; Knight is about evaluation, about the faculty of judgment in economic organization;
and Schumpeter is of course about exploitation, about carrying out of the new combinations and the creative destruc-
tion that often results therefrom". But the deﬁnition of entrepreneurship has been spread to individuals who do not
necessarily respond to those criteria and whose objectives are limited to create their own jobs. In that sense, some ﬁrms
are and remain small (Poschke, 2008). Their creators/managers do not look for a capitalist development and they do
not want to become "empire builders". Those points of view correspond to the notions of employer and non-employer
in Davis et al. (2008). This distinction and the heterogeneity of entrants involves that objectives are different among
entrepreneurs: some of them yearn for start-up high-growth businesses and others aspire to more restrictive ambitions
that is self-employment or micro-enterprises. This paper adopts the French deﬁnition of the ﬁrm2 that includes ﬁrms
with no paid worker and ﬁrms employing at least one worker and thus catches employer and non-employer aspira-
tions. The entrepreneurial literature (Blanchﬂower, 1998; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998) generally focuses on the
decision to enter entrepreneurship or to become/remain as a paid worker and distinguishes entrepreneur-speciﬁc pro-
ﬁles. Key determinants to become entrepreneurs have been emphasized: occupational qualiﬁcations, family resources,
gender, work environment (Berglann, 2009) and entrepreneurial network (Djankov et al., 2005). Dawson et al. (2009,
p. 12) suggest that "motivations that might be considered to choose to become self-employed are: the need for
self-expression, for independence, for status, or for pecuniary advantage. There are signiﬁcant differences between
different types within the self-employed in terms of gender, ethnicity, educational attainment and housing tenure sta-
tus". Those factors and proﬁles have been rarely studied in relation to entrepreneurial objectives themselves while
entrepreneurs present different aspirations. Consequently, personal characteristics may have an inﬂuence on their
objectives.
Among those characteristics, human capital has been received a great deal of attention. Models of occupational choice
(Lazear, 2003; Poschke, 2008) study the individual decision to enter entrepreneurship or become/remain as a paid
worker and isolate human capital, in particular education, as a key factor to enter entrepreneurship: multi-skilled
people are more likely to become entrepreneurs than single skilled people and "a self-employed person needs not
have any other employees and the kinds and combinations of skills that are necessary for real entrepreneurship are
less important for, say, a self-employed handyman who works alone" (Lazear, 2003, p. 3). Thus the level of human
capital and the decision to become entrepreneur or self-employed, that is individual objectives, are correlated; the
relation between education and entrepreneurship is U-shaped that is the most and the least educated people are more
likely to start a business (Poschke, 2008). This statement assumes that education plays a role in the decision to enter
entrepreneurship. Education and the number of skills inﬂuence individual entrepreneurial aspirations.
Self-employment appears as an alternative to paid employment (Rees and Shah, 1989) that is employees may decide
to enter self-employment or entrepreneurship in order to become their own bosses or to have more ﬂexible schedules
(Hamilton, 2000). Self-employment or entrepreneurship is also a possibility for the unemployed: to avoid difﬁculties
on the labor market, an unemployed person may choose to enter entrepreneurship and would have a different objective
than people who become entrepreneur to grow a business. In relation to their status on the labor market, individuals
have different ability to gather the capital needed to start-up.
Blanchﬂower et al. (2000) show that a "latent entrepreneurship" exists that is many people want to enter entrepreneur-
ship or self-employment. Among people with an entrepreneurial spirit, why do so few become entrepreneurs? One
reason is liquidity and ﬁnance constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998). Because
of credit rationing, individuals who decide to become entrepreneurs have to accumulate assets in order to start viable
businesses and to be able to support entry costs. They often raise capital thanks to personal or family funds. Blanch-
ﬂower and Oswald (1998) ﬁnd that, "all else equal, people with greater family assets are more likely to switch to
self-employment from employment" (p. 2). Access to ﬁnancing binds people’s possibilities when entering the market
and consequently sometimes limits their aspirations.
People’s decisions are thus determined by different entrepreneurial aspects and entrepreneurs do not pursue the same
objectives. But little is known about the early objectives. As the entrepreneurial activity in itself is risky and the set-up
2Firms are economic entities that are recorded in the French exhaustive ﬁle of ﬁrms (FICUS).
3of the project is time- and money-costly, an entrepreneur would expect to earn more than a paid-worker and/or get
a higher satisfaction (and even self-realization), or to exit unemployment or an insecure occupational situation. The
entrepreneurial objective could be viewed as binary: securing one’s own job or developing the ﬁrm in terms of jobs
and investments. The ﬁrst objective may be considered as a protection motive. The second one could be seen as a
development motive. These objectives imply two main logics discussed below (Deﬁnitions). The protection motive
may be the prelude to the other, that is entrepreneurs declare at the beginning that they rather prefer securing their jobs
and, as they are well established, they might decide to develop the businesses. The following sections propose simple
estimations to show the determinants of each objective.
Following the literature and those remarks, four hypotheses will be tested:
Hypotheses:
1. As entrepreneurs and paid employees differ from one another, people who want to secure their own jobs differ
from people who want to develop their ﬁrms;
2. Human capital inﬂuences individual objectives;
3. Individual statuses on the labor market have an impact on entrepreneurial objectives;
4. Liquidity and credit constraints bind entrepreneurial ambition.
3 Sources and Empirical Methodology
3.1 SINE Database
In this paper, we use an original and rich dataset from a survey of entrepreneurs (SINE).
The SINE ("système d’information sur les nouvelles enterprises") survey is a permanent observatory system of start-
ups. Its objective is to follow a generation of newly created ﬁrms during ﬁve years. There are three generations of
ﬁrms but we concentrate on the 2002 cohort. Firms can enter the market all year long and the year is divided in two
semesters for interrogation. All the ﬁrms are surveyed three times: the ﬁrst interrogation occurs in the early entry,
the second interrogation occurs three years after birth and the third one occurs ﬁve years after birth. The ﬁrms of the
2002 ﬁrst semester received their ﬁrst questionnaire in September 2002. The second one was given in October 2005.
All ﬁrms were surveyed again in September 2007. Firms surveyed operate in the manufacturing sector, construction,
commerce and services (except ﬁnancial activities). Agriculture is also excluded. The SINE database consists of
44,321 observations3 and 771 variables. SINE includes micro-ﬁrms, in particular those of the services sector that
represent the major part of start-ups, i.e. nearly 60% of new ﬁrms are created in the commerce and repair sector, and
in other services (services to households and to ﬁrms).
3.2 Deﬁnitions
The literature allows us to identify two main objectives that consitute our variable of interest and is represented in the
database as: "What is your main objective?" (SINE survey 2002), the choice they make between two possibilities are
given: (i) "Essentially secure your own job" (i.e. create one’s own job); (ii) "Largely develop your ﬁrm in terms of
employment and investment". The ﬁrm has already been started when entrepreneurs are interviewed while the variable
is related to the objective the project bearer had before starting. We assume that objectives do not change in such a
little time.
3Weights were applied to statistics (i.e. the inverse of poll rate) to any empirical work. Our descriptive following statistics are weighted by the
variable provided by the dataset.
4Considering two subsamples, A denotes people who want to secure their own job and B denotes people who want
to develop their ﬁrms. As they potentially begin their businesses with workers (or maybe they would hire a small
number of workers in the future), people in subsample A cannot be likened to self-employed people. In fact, a part
of self-employment is clearly included in A, as self-employed are non-employer and do not necessarily pursue a
ﬁnancial objective. But on the other hand, securing one’s job does not exclude to have employees. Thus the tempting
combination of self-employed with subsample A is not obvious and proﬁles of both may differ from one another. We
deﬁne people in subsample A as "self-protectors". People in B should be referred to as "developers" as they clearly
declare their goal to "largely develop the ﬁrm in terms of employment and investment". We ﬁnd similar proportions in
each covariate between self-protectors and developers and also between each one and the general sample. In fact a few
covariates present differences. The percentage of CEO or managers is higher among developers than self-protectors
and the percentage of paid employees and people with no professional activity is higher among self-protectors rather
than developers. Differences are also seen in terms of motivation: individuals among self-protectors are more likely
to be without employment, willing to start up and individuals in developers are more likely to have opportunities
and a taste for entrepreneurship (Table 6). The starting amount of capital is generally higher among developers than
self-protectors. A higher percentage of people among developers is present in the groups of highest capital and higher
percentage of people in self-protectors in the groups of lowest capital (Table 4). Finally, people in self-protectors
largely answered "no" to the question of future employees hiring in the next twelve months (Table 2).
3.3 Empirical Methodology
We provide some statistics to explore our ﬁrst hypotheses and describe both self-protectors and developers and estab-
lish the differences between both. This exploitation allows us to precise hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. The main objective
is divided in two subgroups: self-protectors represent 49% of entrepreneurs and developers represent 41% of them.
Around 10% of interviewed people chose nothing4. These two objectives imply two logics we discuss in the following
section.
The proportions of self-protectors and developers among employed and unemployed people are presented in table
1. Self-protectors are in a greater proportion among the unemployed than among the employed. Furthermore, the
difference of proportions between self-protectors and developers is higher among the unemployed (around 15 points)
than among the employed (around 3 points). This difference in the entire sample which includes inactive people is
about 7 points.
We explore hypothesis 2 and ﬁnd that the structures of subsamples in terms of human capital are very similar. Excep-
tions are found in the "previous situation before starting" modality where CEOs are in a greater proportion and people
with no activity are in a lower proportion among developers. Differences are also found in "qualiﬁcations" where inter-
mediate occupations are slightly more important among self-protectors. (Table 3). Looking at diploma, the relation
between diploma and start-up is close to Poschke’s (2008) U-shaped relation between entrepreneurship and education
that is people with low diploma and people with high diploma are more likely to start a business. A very similar
proportion of diploma higher than A-Level (High school degree) is found in both subsamples. Self-protectors have a
greater proportion of people with no diploma than developers.
The differences between subsamples are rather ﬁnancial (table 4). Although we observe that start-up capital is gener-
ally modest, the main trends are that self-protectors rather possess the lowest initial capitals and developers the highest.
Start-up subsidies are granted in similar proportion among each subgroup but people who receive bank loans are in a
greater proportion among developers than they are among self-protectors. Social minimum beneﬁciaries are very few
and are in greater proportion among self-protectors than among developers.
The differences between the two subsamples are also found in the declarations of motivations that led to start-up and
the declarations of possible future hiring (within 12 months) (Tables 5 and 6). The question related to future hiring
4These 10% can be considered in the following way: ﬁrms are inactive from September 2002 on the one hand, entrepreneurs who may not
choose between both objectives on the other.
5was asked at the three questionnaires of the survey. Add to this, the number of paid workers at the beginning and at
ﬁrst interrogation allows us to have some clues about the evolution of entrepreneurs’ behavior. Similar trends were
found between the total number of ﬁrms in 2002 and the ﬁrms that survive during the ﬁve-year period. Self-protectors
were mostly motivated by "independence" and "entrepreneurial taste". The same is found among developers but
the proportion of "entrepreneurial taste" is higher and independence lower than among self-protectors. New Idea
and opportunity are in a greater proportion among developers, corresponding to the Schumpeterian vision of the
entrepreneur in the ﬁrst case. Several motivations may be at the origin of the start-up. Declarations of future hiring
present differences between both subsamples of self-protectors and developers. The whole sample and the group of
ﬁrms surviving all along the period present similar trends of declarations. Self-protectors mainly declare they do not
want to hire workers. The proportion of those people varies along the period and is higher for the second questionnaire
than for the ﬁrst. In the case of developers, those who want to hire are ﬁrst in a larger proportion but then the trend
reverses and those who do not want to hire are more numerous at the second and third questionings. Same proportions
of the number of paid workers by objectives are found between the total sample of ﬁrms in 2002 and the subsample
of ﬁrms that survive along the period5 (Table 7). Self-protectors mostly start their ﬁrms with no worker and the trend
remains all along the period so that many ﬁrms are and remain small. Among ﬁrms surviving along the period, the
proportion of self-protectors employing nobody decline from 2002 to 2007. The same scheme is true in the case of
developers in a more dramatic way.
Our deﬁnitions and these statistical ﬁndings lead to detail our hypotheses:
Hypotheses:
1. As entrepreneurs and paid employees differ from one another, people who want to secure their own jobs differ
from people who want to develop their ﬁrms;
2. Human capital inﬂuences individual decisions: people with high level of human capital (diploma, professional
skills) rather choose to develop the ﬁrm and adopt a Schumpeterian behavior;
3. Individual status on the labor market have an impact on entrepreneurial decisions: unemployed people rather
choose to start a ﬁrm to create their job ;
4. Liquidity and credit constraints bind entrepreneurial ambition: the higher the start-up capital is, the greater the
willingness to become a developer.
We use probit models to determine the impact of different covariates on the entrepreneurial objective. Tables 8 and 9
present the following models: (i) model 1 includes individual characteristics in order to show their role in the objective:
gender, age, nationality (French, European or non-European), highest diploma and qualiﬁcation level (top executive,
intermediate occupation, employee or worker), previous situation before starting i.e. whether entrepreneurs were
independent/self-employed, CEOs/managers, students or inactive (no professional activity), previous activity (active
in employment, long or short term unemployed or inactive) before starting-up, does the entrepreneur have another
activity in another ﬁrm, did he receive vocational training to start-up ("Previous Training"), did he set-up the project
alone or with someone (family network, professional network or with an organism); (ii) the second model takes up the
same set of variables and includes ﬁnancing: start-up capital, getting start-up subsidies or not, getting bank loans or
not, minimum social beneﬁciary or not.
Tables 10 and 11 present the following estimations: the same set of variables than in model 2 plus (iii) variables about
the ﬁrm itself: origin of the start-up (creation ex nihilo, takeover), is the ﬁrm a subsidiary or not, is it a craftsmanship or
not, has the entrepreneur ever created a ﬁrm before ("Has ever Started-Up"); sector of activity (food industry, non food
industry, services to ﬁrms, services to persons, construction, commerce and repair, health and education), a regional
dummy (Paris and its suburbs); (iv) model 4 includes all these variables plus the number of workers at the beginning
5Third questionnaire in table 7 presents large differences because the proportions in the subsample of ﬁrms in 2002 take into account all the
ﬁrms and the percentages are affected by ﬁrms that do not exist anymore in 2007.
6and at the ﬁrst interrogation. Motivation and declaration of possible future hiring were not included in the models
because of simultaneity causing an endogeneity bias.
4 Empirical Results
We estimate the probability to become self-protector controlling for different types of variables, entrepreneur-speciﬁc
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Looking at the results of the ﬁrst regression for hypotheses 1 and 2 (Tables 8 and 9),
we ﬁnd that self-protectors are more likely to be French females over 35 with no diploma, having an intermediate occu-
pation or being paid workers. Females are more likely to choose self-employment to have more ﬂexible schedules, in
particular "the presence of dependent children raises the probability of self-employment" (Dawson et al., 2009, p. 20).
In that respect, self-employment may coincide with our deﬁnition of self-protection ("essentially secure one’s job")
since those people have difﬁculties to enter the labor market but need incomes. They may thus enter entrepreneurship
to avoid gender discrimination (Dickinson and Oaxaca, 2006, Dawson and al., 2009) and take advantage of fringe ben-
eﬁts of independence. On the labor market, the probability to ﬁnd a job decreases in age. Human capital depreciation
is often pointed by employers to discriminate older workers. Long term unemployed people undergo a lock-in effect.
As a result, older workers and long term unemployed people may enter entrepreneurship to avoid the labor market dis-
criminations. Tables 12 to 15 that report marginal effects show that the older an individual, the more likely to become
a self-protector. Furthermore, older people are more likely to accumulate capital and increase their personal resources
to start a business (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998). Students and people with no occupational skills increase their
probability to choose self-protection, sometimes only looking for "pocket-money" in the case of students. No effect of
higher diploma is found invalidating the ﬁrst part of hypothesis 2. Otherwise its second part is conﬁrmed by the fact
that being a worker or an employee increases the probability to become a self-protector than being a top executive.
This is also conﬁrmed by the previous occupation: CEOs or managers are more likely to become developers than oth-
ers. People in middle-class occupations are more likely to start-up to create their own jobs. According to the deﬁnition
of middle-class occupations, people do not a priori aim at developing their businesses in terms of investments and
personnel6. As an extension of what precedes about discriminations on the labor market, hypothesis 3 is conﬁrmed
by the fact that short and long term unemployed (or even inactive) people are more likely to start a business to create
their jobs. This is sometimes the last recourse for people to exit unemployment or precariousness. Tables of marginal
effects show that the longer the unemployment duration the more likely to become a self-protector7. People with no
other activity are more likely to become self-protectors. Their ﬁrms are not income premium but are really a way to
create their own jobs. Self-protectors have no other activity and no entrepreneurial network. Moreover they rather
start their ﬁrms alone. They are more socially isolated than developers and their social capital is lower (Moog and
Backes-Gellner, 2006). We conclude that several factors distinguish self-protectors from developers and those factors
are different from those distinguishing entrepreneurs and paid workers.
Furthermore we are interested in hypothesis 4 and in the impact of ﬁnancing on the decision to become self-protector.
Among ﬁnancing variables, only the "start-up capital" is signiﬁcant. People are more likely to become self-protectors
when they have low initial amounts of capital. Start-up subsidies and bank loans are found non-signiﬁcant. The
introduction of ﬁnancing implies some changes in entrepreneur proﬁles without disturbing the major ﬁndings about
hypotheses 1 and 2. Some variables are no longer signiﬁcant. Being a paid worker against "being independent or
self-employed" is no longer signiﬁcantly favorable to become developer. This situation changes again in models 3
and 4, that is hypothesis 3 about statuses is conﬁrmed. Tables of marginal effects show that the richer the project
bearer, the more likely to become self-protector. To discuss the conclusions on the above hypotheses, we introduce
ﬁrm characteristics. They do not change the main results in a dramatic manner. The general proﬁle established by the
6Two thirds of this category are intermediate occupations between executives and workers. One third is represented by teachers, nurses, social
workers.
7The SINE data do not include any continuous variable of the unemployment duration and thus do not allow the establishment of an increasing
relationship between unemployment duration and the probability to become self-protector as it is suggested here.
7ﬁrst model remains. Sectoral dummies have little impact on the entrepreneurial objective. The most relevant sectors
are "non-food industry", "services to ﬁrms" (model 4) and the most signiﬁcant sector is "education, health and social
activity" (models 3 and 4). Sectoral dummies do not change the signiﬁcance of other variables.
No signiﬁcant effects are found for the number of paid workers at the beginning. But having paid workers ("no paid
worker" as the reference) at the time of the interview has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the decision to become self-
protector. The probability of choosing self-protection decreases with the number of paid managers at the beginning
and paid workers at ﬁrst interrogation. Paris and its suburbs (Ile-de-France) lowers the probability to become self-
protector. In this region unemployed people are more likely to ﬁnd jobs than in provincial ones. They also may ﬁnd
jobs in the informal economy and thus are less likely to start a business to create their own jobs. People liginv in a
provincial region may have less access to employment, in particular in regions of high unemployment rates and spatial
mismatch (Duguet et al., 2009).
5 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this article was to explore differences in entrepreneurial objectives when starting a ﬁrm. Although the
decision to become an entrepreneur has been analyzed in terms of proﬁles, utility and returns, the objectives directly
following ﬁrm creation and their determinants have been barely studied. We deﬁne two types of entrepreneurs that
follow two distinct logics: protection and development in a Schumpeterian sense. We argue that among entrepreneurs,
two main proﬁles can be distinguished and are dependent on personal characteristics (hypothesis 1), human capital
(hypothesis 2), the state of activity on the labor market before starting (hypothesis 3) and ﬁnancing resources to start
the project (hypothesis 4). Moreover, ﬁrm characteristics are also assumed to have an impact on the objectives.
Our hypotheses are partly conﬁrmed by the data. Choosing to start a ﬁrm to create one’s own job depends largely
on discrimination on the labor market and on the possibility to gather initial assets. Females, unemployed people
and those with low start-up capital are more likely to follow this objective. However, although the data conﬁrm the
ﬁnancing hypothesis, our models do not control for a potential endogeneity of the start-up capital which is determined
by individual characteristics. Moreover, start-up subsidies and bank loans may be considered in the same way. It is
reasonable to think that the entrepreneurial behavior changes if entrepreneurs can complete their initial capital with
start-up subsidies or bank loans. Regions also have an impact on the probability to follow one of the objectives, hiding
policy effect or spatial structures effect in terms of job access. A speciﬁc study on public policy across the different
French regions may highlight regional speciﬁcities. Finally, the dichotomous aspect of entrepreneurial objectives
studied in this paper may be rethought. Indeed, in order to go further and ripen those early results, objectives may be
combined with individual motivations and a classiﬁcation may be built to characterize different types of entrepreneurs.
This double approach of entrepreneurship conﬁrms the idea that entrepreneurs have no longer to be seen as people
who want to build empires or as vectors of the spread of innovations, but also as people who start ﬁrms to create their
own jobs and protect themselves from the difﬁculties of the lador market. Those people start ﬁrms with no worker
and have no intention to hire anyone. Thus policies that stimulate those tiny entities to hire people do not appear to be
appropriate.
86 Annexes
Table 1: Variable of Interest: Entrepreneurs’ Objective
Objective
Total Employed Unemployed
No answer 9.82 7.07 6.43
Securing One’s Job 48.68 45.08 54.53
Develop the Firm 41.50 47.85 39.04
Total 100 100 100
Source: Sine survey 2002
Note: statistics were weighted by the inverse of poll rate
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Generalities
Total (%) Objective 1 (%) Objective 2 (%)
Pct. Pct. Pct.
Gender
Male 70.81 66.13 77.36
Female 29.19 33.87 22.64
Nationality
French 89.46 90.22 88.57
European 4.72 4.46 5.02
Non-European 5.82 5.32 6.41
Previous Situation
before Starting
No Answer 3.05 0.04 .
Self-employed 4,528 10.00 11.86
CEO 8.58 4.98 13.22
Paid employee 58.78 62.51 59.15
Student 3.67 4.30 3.37
No Prof. Activity 15.24 18.18 12.41
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
9Table 3: Descriptives Statistics: Human Capital
Total (%) Objective 1 (%) Objective 2 (%)
Diploma
No Answer 3.02 0.02 0.01
No Diploma 16.03 17.32 14.79
GCSE’S under C grade 9.15 10.04 8.51
Professional Certiﬁcate 25.23 25.45 26.66
Technical A Level 9.44 8.69 11.12
General A Level 7.80 7.79 8.23
Ba, Master’s Degree and more 29.33 30.68 30.68
Professional Skills
No Answer 41.25 37.50 40.85
Top Executive 10.67 10.06 12.18
Foreman 5.38 4.95 6.37
Middle-Class Job 7.45 9.28 5.93
Employee 22.29 24.26 21.99
Worker 12.96 13.94 12.67
Have You Received Preliminary Training
No Answer 3.17 0.08 0.01
Yes, after Asking 10.79 11.28 11.15
Yes, because Imposed 19.14 19.89 19.95
Not Received Any 66.90 68.74 68.90
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
10Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Comparison between Subsamples in Financing
Start-up Capital Total (%) Objective 1 (%) Objective 2 (%)
Pct. Pct. Pct.
No Answer 3.25 0.13 0.02
Less than 2,000 19.40 27.73 10.41
2,000 to 4,000 11.72 14.55 9.55
4,000 to 8,000 18.82 18.93 19.69
8,000 to 16,000 16.51 15.78 18.96
16,000 to 40,000 13.17 11.10 16.77
40,000 to 80,000 7.34 5.77 9.79
More than 80,000 9.79 6.00 14.81
Start-Up Subsidies
No Answer 3.34 0.23 0.06
Yes 26.08 27.77 26.69
No 70.59 72.00 73.25
Bank Loan
No Answer 3.35 0.23 0.06
Yes 39.04 35.67 45.22
No 57.61 64.10 54.71
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
Table 5: Motivation to Enter Entrepreneurship
Total (%) Objective 1 (%) Objective 2 (%)
New Idea 21.52 14.61 29.64
Independence 68.19 71.79 63.96
Entrepreneurial Taste 55.14 44.34 67.80
Opportunity 37.62 33.33 42.66
Example from Network 16.27 15.42 17.26
Unemployed, Chose to Start-Up 22.02 27.03 16.14
Unemployed, Obliged to Start-Up 5.97 8.73 2.75
Other Reason 17.96 20.77 14.67
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
11Table 6: Declaration of Future Hiring at the Beginning and the End of The Period
2002 2007
Total (%) Obj. 1 (%) Obj. 2 (%) Total (%) Obj. 1 (%) Obj. 2 (%)
First Interrogation
Yes 25.35 10.30 43.00 26.00 10.71 43.28
No 42.70 61.89 20.20 41.55 60.70 19.91
Do not Know 31.95 27.81 36.80 32.45 28.59 36.81
Second Interrogation
Yes 8.70 4.85 13.21 13.74 7.64 20.63
No 42.65 47.97 36.40 63.45 73.16 52.48
Do not Know 13.38 10.86 16.33 20.36 16.81 24.36
Closed Firms 35.27 36.32 34.05 2.46 2.40 2.53
Third Interrogation
Yes 7.13 4.28 10.48 12.51 7.64 18.00
No 35.09 38.91 30.60 61.51 69.43 52.56
Do not Know 9.80 8.17 11.71 17.17 14.58 20.11
Closed Firms 47.98 48.64 47.21 8.81 8.35 9.34
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
Table 7: Number of Paid Workers in all Firms in 2002 and in Firms Surviving Along the Period
Number of Paid Workers Firms In 2002 Firms on 2002 2007 Period
Total (%) Obj. 1 (%) Obj. 2 (%) Total (%) Obj. 1 (%) Obj. 2 (%)
At the Beginning
No One 74.31 85.52 61.17 73.83 85.75 60.37
One or Two 17.53 11.23 24.92 17.63 10.99 25.12
Three to Five 5.32 2.42 8.71 5.47 2.40 8.93
Six to Nine 1.61 0.53 2.87 1.74 0.54 3.09
More than Ten 1.24 0.30 2.33 1.34 0.33 2.49
First Interrogation
No One 70.95 83.89 55.78 69.83 83.62 54.25
One or Two 18.73 12.23 26.35 19.36 12.56 27.04
Three to Five 6.54 2.80 10.92 6.85 2.73 11.51
Six to Nine 2.16 0.67 3.91 2.25 0.70 3.99
More than Ten 1.62 0.41 3.04 1.71 0.39 3.21
Third Interrogation
No One 78.52 86.08 69.66 62.35 75.16 47.90
One or Two 11.55 9.50 13.95 20.24 16.95 23.96
Three to Five 5.52 3.08 8.38 9.68 5.50 14.40
Six to Nine 2.35 0.89 4.06 4.12 1.59 6.98
More than Ten 2.06 0.45 3.94 3.60 0.80 6.76
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
12Table 8: Estimations Models 1 and 2
Model 1 Model 2
Parameters Estim. Std. Std.
Intercept -0.0663 0.0522 1.0720 *** 0.2309
Gender (Ref. Female) -0.2591 *** 0.0152 -0.2319 *** 0.0155
Age
Less than 25 Ref.
35 to 39 0.1322 *** 0.0309 0.1411 *** 0.0315
40 to 44 0.1674 *** 0.0321 0.1835 *** 0.0327
45 to 49 0.2354 *** 0.0334 0.2685 *** 0.0341
50 and more 0.4051 *** 0.0329 0.4065 *** 0.0336
Nationality
French Ref.
Non European -0.1788 *** 0.0318 -0.2019 *** 0.0323
Diploma
No Diploma Ref.
Professional Certiﬁcate -0.0876 *** 0.0215 -0.0342 0.0220
Technical A-Level -0.1477 *** 0.0271 -0.0680 ** 0.0277
Other Diploma NS NS
Professional Skills
Top Executive Ref.
Intermediate Occupation 0.4023 *** 0.0312 0.3045 *** 0.0320
Employee 0.2331 *** 0.0263 0.1779 *** 0.0270
Worker 0.3491 *** 0.0301 0.2639 *** 0.0309
Previous Situation Before Starting Ref.
Independent or Self-Employed
CEO, Manager -0.4389 *** 0.0310 -0.3230 *** 0.0319
Student 0.2134 *** 0.0443 0.0869 * 0.0454
With no Professional Activity 0.1428 *** 0.0293 0.0877 *** 0.0301
Previous Activity
Active Ref.
Unempl. Less than One Year 0.0700 *** 0.0187 0.0601 *** 0.0205
Unempl. More than One Year 0.1853 *** 0.0218 0.1355 *** 0.0246
Inactive 0.2521 *** 0.0254 0.1870 *** 0.0261
13Table 9: Estimations Models 1 and 2 (Continued)
Other Activity in Another Firm
As a Paid Worker Ref.
As a Non Paid Worker -0.2084 *** 0.0314 -0.1207 *** 0.0323
No Other 0.1446 *** 0.0206 0.2249 *** 0.0214
Has Received Prof. Training
Yes, After Request Ref.
Yes, Because Mandatory 0.0470 * 0.0242 0.0501 ** 0.0246
No 0.0878 *** 0.0211 0.0446 ** 0.0216
Entrepreneurial Network -0.1349 *** 0.0139 -0.1035 *** 0.0142
Who Set-up the Project
Alone Ref.
With the Spouse -0.1575 *** 0.0160 -0.0414 ** 0.0166
With a Family Member -0.4989 *** 0.0182 -0.3775 *** 0.0187
With a Member of the Prev. Firm -0.5172 *** 0.0321 -0.3746 *** 0.0329
With a Support to Firm To Start Up 0.0141 0.0244 0.1263 *** 0.0262
With Members of the Actual Firm -0.4069 *** 0.0772 -0.2201 *** 0.0796
Starting Facilitated by Relations
Suppliers Ref.
Customers 0.0882 *** 0.0201 -0.0114 0.0207
Previous Employer 0.0929 *** 0.0247 0.0398 0.0252
Start-up Capital (Euros)
Less than 1,524 Ref.
1,524 to 3,811 -0.2839 *** 0.0253
3,811 to 7,622 -0.4987 *** 0.0227
7,622 to 15,244 -0.5586 *** 0.0236
15,244 to 38,112 -0.6958 *** 0.0260
38,112 to 76,244 -0.7471 *** 0.0308
More than 76,244 -0.9619 *** 0.0302
Likelihood Ratio 7253.30 9109.15
Wald 6156.07 7486.73
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
14Table 10: Estimations Model 3 and Model 4
Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Estimations Std. Estimations Std.
Intercept 1.1082 *** 0.2386 1.1589 *** 0.2353
Gender (Ref. Female) -0.1679 *** 0.0162 -0.1761 *** 0.0165
Age
Less than 25 Ref.
35 to 39 0.1687 *** 0.0319 0.1582 *** 0.0324
40 to 44 0.2222 *** 0.0333 0.2065 *** 0.0338
45 to 49 0.3117 *** 0.0348 0.3040 *** 0.0354
50 and more 0.4569 *** 0.0344 0.4462 *** 0.0350
Nationality
French Ref.
Non European -0.1693 *** 0.0327 -0.0988 *** 0.0334
Diploma
No Diploma Ref.
Professional Certiﬁcate -0.0247 0.0221 -0.0615 *** 0.0225
Technical A-Level -0.0642 ** 0.0279 -0.1001 *** 0.0284
Other Diploma NS NS
Professional Skills
Top Executive Ref.
Intermediate Occupation 0.2212 *** 0.0331 0.1640 *** 0.0337
Employee 0.1628 *** 0.0276 0.1143 *** 0.0282
Worker 0.2932 *** 0.0323 0.2175 *** 0.0330
Previous Situation Before Starting
Independent or Self-Employed Ref.
CEO, Manager -0.2642 *** 0.0325 -0.2452 *** 0.0333
Student 0.00662 0.0464 -0.0263 0.0470
With no Professional Activity 0.0287 0.0309 0.000626 0.0315
Previous Activity
Active Ref.
Unempl. Less than One Year 0.0724 *** 0.0207 0.0439 ** 0.0210
Unempl. More than One Year 0.1374 *** 0.0248 0.0886 *** 0.0252
Inactive 0.1832 *** 0.0264 0.1457 *** 0.0269
Other Activity in Another Firm
As a Paid Worker Ref.
As a Non Paid Worker -0.1002 *** 0.0327 -0.0906 *** 0.0333
No Other 0.2097 *** 0.0218 0.2202 *** 0.0222
Has Received Prof. Training
Yes, After Request Ref.
Yes, Because Mandatory 0.0802 *** 0.0252 0.0758 *** 0.0255
Not Received Any 0.0345 0.0221 0.0724 *** 0.0224
Entrepreneurial Network -0.0891 *** 0.0144 -0.0913 *** 0.0147
15Table 11: Estimations Model 3 and Model 4 (Continued)
Who Set-up the Project
Alone Ref.
With the Spouse -0.0420 ** 0.0169 -0.0399 ** 0.0171
With a Family Member -0.3605 *** 0.0191 -0.2891 *** 0.0196
With a Member of the Prev. Firm -0.3254 *** 0.0334 -0.2139 *** 0.0344
With a Support to Firm To Start Up 0.1194 *** 0.0274 0.1145 *** 0.0277
With Members of the Actual Firm -0.2301 *** 0.0825 -0.0802 *** 0.0859
Starting Facilitated by Relations
Suppliers Ref.
Customers 0.0133 0.0214 0.0124 0.0217
Previous Employer 0.0570 ** 0.0257 0.0789 *** 0.0262
Start-up Capital (Euros)
Less than 1,524 Ref.
1,524 to 3,811 -0.2640 *** 0.0255 -0.2311 *** 0.0258
3,811 to 7,622 -0.4647 *** 0.0229 -0.4069 *** 0.0233
7,622 to 15,244 -0.5280 *** 0.0240 -0.4583 *** 0.0244
15,244 to 38,112 -0.6681 *** 0.0265 -0.5800 *** 0.0270
38,112 to 76,244 -0.7181 *** 0.0317 -0.5756 *** 0.0326
More than 76,244 -0.9137 *** 0.0317 -0.6597 *** 0.0329
Has ever Started-Up
Never Started-Up Ref.
One Firm -0.0616 *** 0.0199 -0.0425 ** 0.0203
Two Firms or more -0.1353 *** 0.0286 -0.1004 *** 0.0292
Origine of Start-up
Ex Nihilo Creation Ref.
Takeover 0.00842 0.0186 0.1588 *** 0.0194
Subsidiary -0.3658 *** 0.0350 -0.2808 *** 0.0359
Craftmanship -0.0654 *** 0.0202 -0.0265 0.1984 0.0206
Sector
Food Industry Ref.
Non Food Industry -0.0695 0.0461 -0.1200 ** 0.0472
Services to Firms 0.00171 0.0447 -0.0935 ** 0.0457
Education, Health 0.5764 *** 0.0554 0.4877 *** 0.0566
Paris and Suburbs -0.1089 *** 0.0225 -0.1054 *** 0.0229
Paid Workers at the Beginning NS
Paid Workers at the First Interrogation
No Paid Workers Ref.
One -0.5188 *** 0.0293
Two to Nineteen -0.9225 *** 0.0454
More than twenty -1.1212 *** 0.2207
Likelihood Ratio 7253.30 9109.15
Wald 6156.07 7486.73
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
16Table 12: Marginal Effects Model 1 and Model 2
Model 1 Model 2
Param. dF/dx (Std. Err.) P > z dF/dx (Std. Err.) P > z
Gender Male -.1016 (.0059) *** -.0912 (.006) ***
Age
Less Than 25 Ref.
35 to 39 .0545 (.0120) *** .0593 (.0122) ***
40 to 44 .0696 (.0124) *** .0764 (.0125) ***
45 to 49 .0948 (.0127) *** .1088 (.0127) ***
50 and more .1582 (.0119) *** .1602 (.0121) ***
Nationality
French Ref.
European -.0228 (.0131) * -.0316 (.0135) **
Non-European -.0719 (.0126) *** -.0816 (.0127) ***
Diploma
No Diploma Ref.
Professional Certiﬁcate -.0353 (.0085) *** -.0155 (.0087) *
Technical A-Level -.0589 (.0108) *** -.0297 (.011) ***
Professional Skills
Top Executive Ref.
Intermediate Occupation .1535 (.0112) *** .117 (.0119) ***
Employee .0914 (.0102) *** .0686 (.0105) ***
Worker .1348 (.0111) *** .1023 (.0117) ***
Previous Situation Before Starting
Independent or Self-Employed Ref.
CEO, Manager -.1739 (.0119) *** -.1295 (.0125) ***
Student .0815 (.0169) *** .0321 (.0178) *
With no Professional Activity .0563 (.0114) *** .0353 (.0117) ***
17Table 13: Marginal Effects Model 1 and Model 2 (Continued)
Previous Activity
Active Ref.
Unempl. Less than One Year .0280 (.0073) *** .0231 (.0075) ***
Unempl. More than One Year .073 (.0084) *** .0559 (.0087) ***
Inactive .0985 (.0097) *** .0739 (.0100) ***
Other Activity in Another Firm
As a Paid Worker Ref.
As a Non Paid Worker -.0834 (.0125) *** -.05014 (.0129) ***
No Other Activity .0561 (.0082) *** .0865 (.0085) ***
Entrepreneurial Network .0537 (.0055) *** .042 (.0056) ***
Who Set-up the Project
Alone Ref.
With the Spouse -.0746 (.0069) *** -.0245 (.0071) ***
With a Family Member -.2083 (.0073) *** -.1557 (.0077) ***
With a Member of the Prev. Firm -.2274 (.0119) *** -.1699 (.013) ***
With a Support to Firm To Start Up -.0304 (.01) *** .0218 (.0102) **
With Members of the Actual Firm -.1909 (.0289) *** -.1062 (.0315) ***
Starting Facilitated by Relations
Suppliers Ref.
Customers .0349 (.0086) *** -.0107 (.0089) NS
Previous Employer .0412 (.0104) *** .0103 (.0108) NS
Start-up Capital (Euros)
Less than 1,524 Ref.
1,524 to 3,811 -.1146 (.01) ***
3,811 to 7,622 -.1987 (.0086) ***
7,622 to 15,244 -.2247 (.0088) ***
15,244 to 38,112 -.2806 (.0087) ***
38,112 to 76,244 -.2949 (.0099) ***
More than 76,244 -.3651 (.0087) ***
LR chi2(38) 4308.51
LR chi2(51) 6482.36
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
18Table 14: Marginal Effects Model 3 and Model 4
Model 3 Model 4
Param. dF/dx (Std. Err.) P > z dF/dx (Std. Err.) P > z
Gender Male -.0665 (.0063) *** -.0688 (.0064) ***
Age
35 to 39 .0663 (.0123) *** .0640 (.0125) ***
40 to 44 .0882 (.0126) *** .0832 (.0128) ***
45 to 49 .1232 (.0128) *** .1191 (.0131) ***
50 and more .1763 (.0121) *** .1715 (.0125) ***
Nationality
French Ref.
Non-European -.0696 (.0129) *** -.0377 (.0131) ***
Diploma
No Diploma Ref.
Professional Certiﬁcate -.0133 (.0087) NS -.0277 (.0089) ***
Technical A-Level -.0309 (.0110) *** -.0447 (.0112) ***
Professional Skills
Top Executive Ref.
Intermediate Occupation .0861 (.0126) *** .0639 (.0130) ***
Employee .0663 (.0108) *** .0461 (.0111) ***
Worker .1173 (.012) *** .0881 (.0126) ***
Previous Situation Before Starting
Independent or Self-Employed Ref.
Foreman -.1036 (.0129) *** -.0949 (.0132) ***
Paid Worker -.0267 (.0126) ** -.0263 (.0129) **
Previous Activity
Active Ref.
Unempl. Less than One Year .0299 (.0076) *** .0148 (.0078) *
Unempl. More than One Year .0612 (.0087) *** .0348 (.009) ***
Inactive .0756 (.0101) *** .0614 (.0104) ***
Other Activity in Another Firm
As a Paid Worker Ref.
As a Non Paid Worker -.0462 (.0130) *** -.0402 (.0132) ***
No Other Activity .0786 (.0087) *** .0807 (.0088) ***
Entrepreneurial Network .0380 (.0056) *** .0381 (.0057) ***
19Table 15: Marginal Effects Model 3 and Model 4 (Continued)
Who Set-up the Project
Alone Ref.
With the Spouse -.0239 (.0072) *** -.0209 (.008) ***
With a Family Member -.1472 (.0078) *** -.1203 (.008) ***
With a Member of the Prev. Firm -.1607 (.0132) *** -.1165 (.0138) ***
With Members of the Actual Firm -.1182 (.0325) *** -.0617 (.0343) *
Start-up Capital (Euros)
Less than 1,524 Ref.
1,524 to 3,811 -.1067 (.0101) *** -.0936 (.0102) ***
3,811 to 7,622 -.1866 (.0088) *** -.1635 (.009) ***
7,622 to 15,244 -.2142 (.0089) *** -.1873 (.0091 ) ***
15,244 to 38,112 -.2725 (.009) *** -.2398 (.0095) ***
38,112 to 76,244 -.2908 (.0104) *** -.2338 (.0114) ***
More than 76,244 -.3589 (.0094) *** -.2672 (.0112) ***
Has ever Started-Up
Never Started-Up Ref.
One Firm -.0238 (.0079) *** -.0167 (.0080) **
Two Firms or more -.0516 (.0113) *** -.0373 (.0116) ***
Origine of Start-up
Ex Nihilo Creation Ref.
Origine of Start-up NS
Subsidiary -.1458 (.0135) *** -.1117 (.014) ***
Craftmanship -.0269 (.008) *** -.0141 (.0082) *
Sector
Food Industry Ref.
Non Food Industry -.0246 (.0183) NS -.0514 (.0187) ***
Real Estate Activity .0630 (.0217) *** -.0078 (.0228) NS
Services to Firms .0004 (.0177) NS -.0406 (.0181) **
Education, Health .2128 (.0177) *** .1778 (.0193) ***
Paris and Suburbs -.0439 (.0089) *** -.0404 (.0091) ***
Paid Workers at the Beginning NS
Paid Workers at the First Interrogation
No Paid Workers Ref.
One -.1835 (.0112) ***
Two to Nineteen -.3809 (.0311) ***
More than twenty -.4017 (.0501) ***
LR chi2(69) 7095.78
LR chi2(77) 8950.20
Source: SINE survey 2002
Note: Objective 1 refers to "Securing one’s employment" and Objective 2 refers to "Developing the ﬁrm"
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